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Federally Mandated Destruction of the Black Family: The Adoption and Safe Families Act
Christina White

I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to matters of the home, the constitutional provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment give substantial deference to the independence of the familial unit to make its own
decisions. 1 There are instances, however, where the government deems it necessary to intrude
upon the independence of the familial unit. This intrusion is especially evident in the foster care
system. Although the system by its very definition requires some governmental intervention for
the welfare of the child, the goal of foster care should be assistance and eventually reunification
to allow the family to function as an independent entity. The Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA) represents a stark deviation from that goal. With black children representing an
overwhelming percentage of the foster care population, the ASFA represents federally mandated
destruction of black families. The ASFA devalues the essentialness of preserving the familial
bond with regard to black children. It advocates earlier termination of parental rights and makes
adoption, instead of reunification, its priority.
This comment criticizes ASFA and its aim of removing black children from their homes
as a means to achieve permanency in their lives. Preservation of black families is essential to the
advancement of the black community. Legislation must be directed at addressing the underlying
social ills that are at the root of foster care dependence. Instead, under the pretext of advancing
child welfare, ASFA promotes destruction of black familial bonds and represents a serious threat
to black communities.
1

See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (noting the living standards of a family are a
matter of the family's concern, not the court's); Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing the
traditionally private realm of family life in which the state must not interfere without a compelling justification).
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This comment begins by providing a brief history of child welfare legislation in the
United States. It discuses the political tide of the country and political justifications for the
creation of ASFA. It examines its specific provisions and details how the legislation
disproportionately impacts black children and families. This comment also examines the socioeconomic factors of extreme poverty, incarceration, and substance abuse that plague black
communities, and advocates dealing with these situations through a holistic approach that works
in conjunction with familial reunification efforts instead of against them. Finally, this comment
argues that the termination of parental rights has constitutional implications. The legislation has
an impact on substantive and procedural due process as well as equal protection rights. Although
the comment does not attempt to pose a solution to the child welfare system, it does advocate a
shift in the focus of the system. The familial bond is essential to black children, and family
preservation and reunification should be the goal of any child welfare system.

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF CHILD WELFARE POLICY
In historical terms, state intervention for the protection of children is a recent
development, particularly as it relates to children of color. 2 Although the institution of slavery
dismantled black families, it also fostered a unique system that maintained and cared for black
children who were separated from their biological parents. 3 When children were stripped from
their parents and sold away to other plantations, the slave community as a whole took on the

2

Zanita Fenton, Foster Care: The Border of Family Identity Maintaining, (Re)creating, Destroying, 36 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 59, 60-61 (2001).
3

Id. at 60.
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responsibility of ensuring these children were cared for. 4 After emancipation from slavery and
the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, black children were not welcomed into the formal
child welfare system. 5 They were excluded from the late nineteenth-century orphanages
established to rescue destitute immigrant children. 6 Furthermore, Jim Crow laws prevented
black children from being cared for by the institutions of white society that tried to place orphans
in adoptive homes. 7 Even after such discriminatory laws were dismantled, black children were
still denied access to most formal child welfare institutions because they were undesirable to
white adoptive parents. 8 A few "colored orphan asylums" existed, but they were overcrowded
and generally inferior. 9 Black people were forced to rely primarily on other resources such as
extended family networks and churches to take care of children whose parents were unable to
meet their needs. 10 It was not until the late twentieth century that the child welfare system
allowed blacks to participate in services that had long been reserved for the white community. 11

4

See generally NATHAN I. HUGGINS, BLACK ODYSSEY 154-82 (1977) (describing the effects of slavery on the black
family).

5

See JOYCE A. LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES: ADOPTING ACROSS RACIAL BOUNDARIES 67 (1978).

6

Dorothy E. Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for Children, 76 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1619, 1622
(2001).

7

LADNER, supra note 5.

8

Id. at 67-68 (citing Andrew Billingsley & Jeanne Giovanni, Research Perspectives on Interracial Adoption, in
RACE RESEARCH & REASON: SOCIAL WORK PERSPECTIVES 139-73 (Roger Willer ed., 1969)(“When these agencies
were unable to place black children as fast as white children, the agencies began to define the children and the
families as problems . . . The fact that the agencies had long excluded black children and families, and were thus
inexperienced in serving them, was quickly forgotten.”)).
9

Roberts, supra note 6, at 1622.

10

Id.

11

See Ladner, supra note 5, at 67 (“Billingsley and Giovanonni assert that it was immediately following World War
II that adoption agencies began trying to include black children in their programs.”).
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The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) served as the
beginning of pivotal federal legislation in the modern day child welfare arena. The AACWA
was the first attempt at providing federal funds to reduce the amount of time children spent in
foster care. 12 The government provided financial incentives for states to change child welfare
policies and attempt to move children out of foster care and encourage permanent placement
through reunification and adoption. 13 This policy was influenced by the theory that disruption of
the parent-child relationship caused a great deal of emotional damage. 14 Therefore, the policy
encouraged permanent placement with a family, either biological or adoptive, as opposed to the
child becoming “trapped in the system” and spending a long period of time in foster care. 15
With its emphasis on family preservation, the AACWA made kinship foster care a viable
addition to the child welfare system. 16 Kinship foster care occurs when relatives become foster
parents for children in state custody. 17 In 1979, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Youakim
established kinship foster care as a means to deal with the increasing foster care population. 18
The Court ruled that kin are entitled to receive the same federal financial support for foster care

12

Paul Anthony Wilhelm, Note, Permanency at What Cost? Five Years of Imprudence Under the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 617, 623 (2002).

13

Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

14

This theory is called the “psychological parent” theory. See Wilhelm, supra note 12, at 624 (citing Mary
O’Flynn, Comment, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: Changing Child Welfare Policy Without
Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 243, 251 (1999)).
15

Id.

16

Madeleine L. Kurtz, The Purchase of Families into Foster Care: Two Case Studies and the Lessons They Teach,
26 CONN. L. REV. 1453, 1470 (1994).

17

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON KINSHIP FOSTER CARE 5
(2000)[hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS].
18

Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979).
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as non-kin foster parents. 19 Kinship care and the concept of extended family child rearing
originated in Africa and have been relied on by black families throughout history. 20 The child
welfare system began to embrace this concept because it found there was less trauma and
disruption in the lives of children placed with kin as opposed to children placed with non-kin. 21
There was also evidence that the "sense of family identity, self-esteem, social status, community
ties, and continuity of family relationships" in kinship arrangements was important to a child. 22
The child welfare system therefore determined that children do better within their own families
and that placement with kin should be given priority when possible.23
In addition to allowing for kinship care, the AACWA required “reasonable efforts” to
reunify families. 24 Although the Act provided little guidance as to what constituted “reasonable
efforts,” most states determined that such efforts included delivering social services. 25
Caseworkers attempted to create an individualized approach with both soft and concrete services
to treat families. 26 Their services included instituting a plan of “positive parent-child interaction
and problem solving” within the home, as well as ensuring the basic needs such as adequate

19

Id.

20

See Sonia Gipson Rankin, Why They Won't Take the Money: Black Grandparents and the Success of Informal
Kinship Care, 10 ELDER L.J. 153, 157 (2002).

21

REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 9.

22

Id. at 10.

23

Id. at 9.

24

42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (1999).

25

See Wilhelm, supra note 12, at 624.

26

See Marianne Berry, Overview of Family Preservation, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK
OF PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 319, 321 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005).

307

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

VOL. 1, NO. 1

food, safe housing and paid utilities had been met. 27 Termination of parental rights was allowed
only when the state’s “reasonable efforts” to preserve the familial structure failed.28
Child welfare as it relates to foster care is intrinsically linked to general welfare policy in
this country. 29 Although initially the AACWA was a success, with the foster care population
decreasing by over fifty percent, from 500,000 to 243,000, between 1980 and 1982, 30 the
decrease came right before a period in our history when homelessness, substance abuse and HIV
began to overwhelm the country. 31 By 1983, the foster care population again began to rise and
by 1998 it had more than doubled. 32 Expenditures for social service programs increased
dramatically. 33 Frustrated with the increasing economic and social cost of the welfare system,
the country deemed efforts, including child welfare policies like the AACWA failures. 34
Tensions grew as the political tide was quickly turning to the right. “Individual
responsibility” became a prevailing political value, replacing the idea of “social responsibility”

27

Id. at 320-321.

28

See Wilhelm, supra note 12, at 623.

29

In most cases they serve the same population. See Kathy Barbell & Madelyn Freunlich, Foster Care Today, in
CHILD WELFARE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 504, 506 (Gerald
P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005)(stating that more than half the children in foster care qualified for
federally assisted foster care, which is tied to eligibility for welfare benefits). Furthermore, the ability to meet the
basic needs of children, such as food and shelter, can be a direct reflection on a parent’s access to welfare benefits.
30

Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales From the Age of ASFA, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 129, 135 (2001)
(citing LEROY PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE
U.S. 6 (1989)).
31

Id. at 136.

32

Id. at 135.

33

Hilary Baldwin, Termination of Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Proposed Solutions, 28 J. LEGIS. 239, 255
(2002).
34

Id.
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that was at the core of the AACWA. 35 In the general welfare arena, politicians vehemently
attacked public assistance programs, and their attacks included a very strong racial element. 36
They proliferated the racist notion that black people were “living off” the system. 37 Images of
the black welfare queen and the black crack addicted mother spread throughout the media. 38
These images supported the position that assistance programs were not helping people in need
rehabilitate themselves; they were providing a means for poor blacks to continue their
destructive lifestyles. 39
This burgeoning political transformation and desire to decrease reliance on welfare
programs swept the country. It prompted Congress to enact the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, otherwise known as the Welfare Reform Act
(“the Act”). 40 The Act was designed to eliminate federal entitlements and cut government
expenditures and essentially dismantled the federally funded Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program. 41
Although the Welfare Reform Act was created to drastically cut social welfare
expenditures, it left entitlements for foster care and adoption assistance programs uncapped. 42

35

Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,
38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 23 (2001).

36

See Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice In Children’s Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family Preservation
Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 132 (1999) [hereinafter Roberts, Is There Justice].

37

Id.

38

See id. at 131.

39

Id. at 132.

40

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).

41

Id.

42

Id.
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The increasingly pervasive belief was that it was better to place children out of the home instead
of working to correct the social ills that required states to intrude into the home in the first place.
Newt Gingrich, the Republican Speaker of the House at that time, echoed this sentiment when he
argued that government funds going to children born to welfare mothers should be diverted to
programs that would put their babies up for adoption or place them in orphanages. 43 Reflections
of this sentiment are apparent in the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA).

III. THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT OF 1997
The ASFA made adoption the core means of achieving permanence in the lives of
children in the foster care system. Although the previous legislation, the AACWA, favored
permanent placement and created some incentives for adoption, it still funded and focused on
solutions that prevented child removal. The AACWA’s initiatives were aimed at achieving
permanence through “reasonable efforts” for reunification and maintaining the familial
structure. 44 ASFA, however, effectively eliminated the “reasonable efforts” requirement and
focused on adoption as the best solution to ensure permanent placement of children in foster
care. 45
Maintaining the foster care system is a major expense, requiring a great deal of
government resources. 46 This expense increases significantly when government programs to

43

GOP Welfare Plan Would Take Cash from Unwed Mothers to Aid Adoptions, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1994, at 7.

44

See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(1999).

45

Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)(codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).

46

See Erika Lynn Kleiman, Caring For Our Own: Why American Adoption Law and Policy Must Change, 30
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 327, 360 (1997)(stating that foster care system in the United States costs around
$10,000 to $20,000 per child annually resulting in an annual cost of around $9.1 billion).
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rehabilitate families become a meaningful part of the foster care system. 47 When it created the
ASFA, Congress, in effect, concluded that reunification efforts were not worth the expense and
began strongly pushing adoption for foster care children. 48 The House Report from the ASFA
recognized “that adoption is an effective way to assure that children grow up in loving families
and that they become happy and productive citizens as adults.” 49 With a new focus on finding
foster care children permanent adoptive homes instead of rehabilitating families, Congress
exponentially reduced its expenditures. 50 The ASFA’s focus on termination of parental rights
and assistance for adoption, has nothing to do with protecting children from abuse or neglect. To
reduce costs, Congress shifted its focus from the concerns of the family as a whole, to reducing
the amount of time a child needs state support.
“The Adoption and Safe Families Act is designed to force states to quickly seek a
hearing on termination, to facilitate permanent adoptions, rather than waste time and money
on temporary solutions!” 51 Therefore, after parental unfitness has been established, under the
ASFA, states are required to hold permanency hearings and file a petition to terminate
parental rights after a child has been in foster care for fifteen months. 52 After the state files a
petition to terminate, a Juvenile Court Judge determines if it is in the best interest of the child

47

See id.

48

H.R. Rep. No. 105-77 at 8 (1997), as reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740.

49

Id.

50

Once a child is adopted, she is no longer dependant on the state and does not require the governmental aid she
required while she was in the foster care system.

51

Baldwin, supra note 33, at 260.

52

Exceptions are possible when there is a compelling reason why such termination is not in the best interest of the
child. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(1997).
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for the parental rights to be terminated. 53 If the judge determines that termination is in the
child’s best interest, the child’s parents are no longer responsible and have no legal rights to
their child. 54 The parents lose the right to participate in the child’s upbringing and to interact
with the child in any way. After termination, the child permanently loses any legal connection
to his or her natural family.
Additionally, ASFA provides financial incentives to states that place children in adoptive
homes. 55 To accomplish this goal, Congress abandoned the social policy that placing black
children in black homes was important to the development of black children. 56 Instead, through
the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act (MEPA) 57 and the Inter-Ethnic Adoption Act 58 , Congress
denied federal funding to agencies that placed children according to their race or took race into
consideration when making placement decisions. Congress’s justification for the change in
policy was that race-matching policies, “damage black children by not only denying them
placements with white adoptive parents, but also by causing them to languish in foster care.” 59

53

See Abuse and Neglect Unit, http://www.countyofkane.org/sao/ABUSE/ABUSE.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2006).

54

See id.

55

See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1997).

56

ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING 94-99 (1993).

57

Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, §§ 551-54, 108 Stat. 3518,
4056-57 (1994) (repealed 1996).
58

Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoptions, § 1808 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-188, § 1808, 110 Stat. 1755, 1903-04 (1996).

59

Id.
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IV. THE ASFA DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTS THE BLACK COMMUNITY
Although the ASFA refers to child welfare policies generally, it has a disproportionate
impact on black children and the black community. Black children represent an overwhelmingly
disproportionate number of children in the foster care system, comprising forty percent of the
foster care population but only fifteen percent of the general population under the age of
eighteen. 60 For every 1,000 white children in the U.S., five were in foster care as of September
20, 2000. Compared with twenty-one black foster care children for every 1,000 black children in
the U.S. 61 In cities where there is a sizeable minority and foster care population, the percentages
are even more staggering. For example, Chicago has a foster care population that is ninety-five
percent black. 62 In New York City in 1997, of the 42,000 children in the foster care system, only
1,300 were white children. 63 These statistics reveal the foster care system is generally a
population of black children, and any social policy addressing the system must take this into
consideration.
Contrary to popular opinion, most children are not in foster care because they have been
seriously abused. Instead, neglect is the most prevalent reason children enter foster care. 64
There are substantial differences between abuse and neglect. Child abuse is an act of

60

Ruth G. McRoy, Overrepresentation of Children and Youth of Color in Foster Care, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 623, 623 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt
Hess eds., 2005)(citing the 2004 statistics from the Adoption and Foster Care Data Analysis System 8 datasets).
61

Id. at 624.

62

Natalie Pardo, Losing Their Children: As State Cracks Down on Parents, Black Families Splinter, 28 CHI. REP. 1,
7 (1999).
63

Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1716, 1718 n.11 (2000)(reviewing ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999)).
64

See Dorothy E. Roberts, Access to Justice: Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child Welfare Policy, 1 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 68 (1999).
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commission, in which parents or others act violently or cruelly toward the child. 65 In contrast,
child neglect is an act of omission and is often related to poverty. 66 Children who are considered
neglected are usually chronically deprived of basic needs, such as food, clothing and adequate
shelter or adequate parenting practices including hygiene, health care, safety precautions, and
minimal nurturing and attention. 67
Statistics illustrate there is a strong correlation between foster care placement and
poverty. 68 A 1998 study reported that abuse and neglect are reported to be twenty-two times
higher among families with incomes less than $15,000 per year than with families with incomes
of more than $30,000 a year. 69 This is especially significant because half of all black children
are born into poverty in the United States. 70 Furthermore, black children are more than three
times as likely as whites to live in extreme poverty. 71
Extreme poverty itself is responsible for creating circumstances that lead to neglect. For
example, “poor nutrition, serious health problems, hazardous housing, inadequate heat and
utilities and neighborhood crime” all can result from living in extreme poverty.72 Child welfare
authorities can remove children from poverty stricken homes if they can demonstrate parental

65

Marianne Berry, Overview of Family Preservation, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF
PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 319, 323 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005).
66

Id.

67

Id.

68

McRoy, supra note 60, at 624.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 72.

71

See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 171, 176 (2003) [hereinafter
Roberts, Child Welfare].
72

See id. at 175.
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carelessness will increase the likelihood that these hazards will result in actual harm to the
child. 73
Black children are much more susceptible to state intrusion since they often live in
poverty and as a result are frequently forced to interact with government agencies. The state
must have probable cause to enter the homes of most American families. If the family is
receiving public assistance, however, such privacy rights are substantially eroded because, in
order to receive assistance, you must allow state social workers to enter your home. 74
In addition to public assistance, under-privileged black families lead more public lives
than their middle-class, white counterparts. Instead of visiting private doctors, these families are
more likely to visit public clinics or emergency rooms for routine medical care. 75 They are more
likely to encounter public building inspectors, instead of hiring contractors to repair their homes,
and they often run their errands using public transportation instead of private vehicles. 76
Because these families interact with public and governmental agencies so regularly their
problems are more visible to child protection authorities. 77 This results in their children being
placed in the foster care system more frequently.
Poverty alone, however, does not explain the overrepresentation of black children in
foster care population. It is the convergence of both race and class bias that leave black children

73

See id.

74

See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971)(holding that women receiving New York’s Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (“AFDC”) must permit state social workers to enter their homes even though the visits shared
some characteristics of a Fourth Amendment search and seizure for which a warrant would normally be required).

75

See Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child
Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 584 (1997).

76

See id.

77

Id.
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particularly susceptible to foster care placement. Child protective agencies are far more likely to
place black children in foster care then they are to place white children in foster care. 78 With
black families, foster care is used as a solution to the problems of the home, instead of offering
government assistance that is less traumatic to the family. 79 A 2002 study by the Minnesota
Department of Human Services found that only forty percent of black families receive family
centered prevention based counseling compared with sixty percent of white families. 80
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported that black children
were more likely than whites to be in foster care placement. 81 In 1998, fifty-six percent of black
children who entered the child welfare system were placed in foster care, nearly double the
percentage for white children. 82
Instead of the state keeping the child in the home and providing counseling and in-home
services to the family, black children were placed in foster care even when they faced the same
issues as white children. 83 Even under identical circumstances, most white children in the child
welfare system are allowed to stay with their families, while black children are ripped from their
families and placed in foster care.

78

Dorothy Roberts, Racial Harm; Dorothy Roberts Explains How Racism Works in the Child Welfare System,
COLORLINES, Fall 2002, at 19 [hereinafter Roberts, Racial Harm].

79

Id.

80

McRoy, supra note 60, at 628.

81

Roberts, Child Welfare, supra note 71, at 172 (citing ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 1998: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 2000)).
82

Id. at 172.

83

Id. at 173.
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Removing children from families due to maternal substance abuse has led to an increase
in the number of black children in the foster care system. 84 The system of detecting and
reporting drug use during pregnancy, which leads to the removal of the newborn from the care of
its mother, is plagued by race bias. 85 A study in Pennelas County Florida of reporting of prenatal
drug usage found that despite similar rates of drug use, black patients were ten times more likely
to be reported to child protective authorities for drug usage during pregnancy than white
patients. 86 The desire to remove these children from the care of their mothers can be attributed
to pervasive stereotypical images of black crack babies and pregnant black crack addicts. 87 This
racist stereotyping ultimately contributes to the disproportionate number of black children in the
foster care system.
Finally, incarceration requires black children to enter the foster care system and places
incarcerated black parents in danger of having their parental rights terminated. 88 In 2000, 1.5
million children had at least one parent in prison and a disproportionately high percentage of
these parents were black. 89 In general, children of incarcerated fathers do not end up in the

84

Dorothy Roberts, The Challenge of Substance Abuse for Family Preservation Policy, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 72, 85 (1999) [hereinafter Roberts, The Challenge of Substance Abuse].
85

See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 175
(1997).

86

Id.

87

Roberts, The Challenge of Substance Abuse, supra note 84, at 86 (stating that “the public’s willingness to remove
so many babies from their mothers is based on largely racialized myths about crack babies and pregnant crack
addicts”).
88

Antoinette Greenway, When Neutral Policies Aren’t So Neutral: Increasing Incarceration Rates and the Effect of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 on the Parental Rights of African-American Women, 17 NAT’L BLACK
L.J. 247, 255 (2004) (explaining incarceration often causes parents to place their children in foster care because they
have no intervening options for immediate care of their children).
89

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000 (2000).
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foster care system because they continue to reside with their mothers. 90 In contrast, when
mothers are incarcerated, their children are frequently placed in foster care. 91 Although kinship
foster care is a viable option to avoid placing the child outside the familial context, oftentimes
the extended family is unable to support the needs of the child, and state foster care placement
outside the family becomes the only option. 92
Nearly eighty percent of incarcerated women are mothers who have two or more children
that they had the primary responsibility of caring for prior to incarceration. 93 Some of these
women have children who were forced to enter the foster care system for the first time after their
incarceration. 94 The percentage of incarcerated mothers is particularly devastating to the black
community; nearly half of all imprisoned parents are black. 95 Black women are six times more
likely to be incarcerated than their white counterparts. 96 Felony conviction or incarceration is an
appropriate ground for a judge to terminate parental rights. 97 While these incarcerated mothers
are serving their sentences they cannot “rehabilitate and resume custody” of their children and
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See id.
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See id.
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(2001).
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demonstrate their ability to parent. 98 This makes it easier for a judge to terminate their parental
rights and place children of incarcerated black mothers up for adoption.

V. THE ASFA DEVALUES AND DEHUMANIZES THE BLACK FAMILY
Historically, the Supreme Court has held the view that the family is a private institution
where individuals are free to pursue their goals without the threat of government intrusion. 99
The Constitutional basis for family privacy is rooted in the guarantee of “liberty” in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 100 Family privacy protects the rights of parents to
claim authority over their children and provide the “personal, financial, or custodial
responsibility” for their growth into adulthood. 101 As far back as 1943, the Supreme Court
stated, “[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of a child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.” 102 These “obligations” include preparing the child to participate in
social and political life when he or she reaches adulthood. 103
The law clearly protects the rights of parents to participate in the nurturing and rearing of
their children. In the context of divorce, even if a parent was neglectful or abusive prior to the
divorce, he is still entitled to be a part of his child’s life. The goal is to make divorce less

98
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See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943).
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onerous on the child. 104 A court may even prevent a custodial parent from relocating out of state
to allow the child’s relationship with both parents to continue after the divorce. 105 Although a
stepparent may obtain rights with respect to his or her stepchild, these rights do not interfere or
replace the rights that the law grants to a natural parent. There is a general understanding that
the maintenance of family and biological parental ties are beneficial to the child.
The ASFA reveals, however, that Congress places no such value in maintaining the
bonds between a black child and her biological parents. Deeply rooted stereotypes about black
family dysfunction place no value on the relationship between poor, black parents and their
children. 106 With the proliferation of images such as the black welfare queen and crack addicted
mother, black mothers are characterized as “deviant and uncaring.” 107 They are criticized for
“transferring a degenerate lifestyle of welfare dependency and crime to their children.” 108 Black
fathers are simply seen as absent from the lives of their children. 109 These racist stereotypes
about black family dysfunction are indiscriminately applied and make it difficult to imagine
poor, black parents actually caring for their children. With legislation like the ASFA, the child
104

See Edwin J. Terry, RELOCATION: Moving Forward or Moving Backward?, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 983, 1012
(2000) (stating the belief that if the noncustodial parent sees the child on a regular basis, the custodial parent
continues to be supported and exercises appropriate discipline and the parents are able to cooperate without conflict
then the child's standard of living changes little; and the transition is accompanied by no other major disruptions in
the child's life there can be a satisfactory adjustment to the divorce).
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See id. at 988 (stating “the effect of the move on the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent is
a central concern”).
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of… the Victorian norm of female domesticity never applied to black women… Even after emancipation, political
and economic conditions forced many Black mothers to earn a living outside the home. Americans expected Black
mothers to look like Aunt Jemima, working in somebody else's kitchen: ‘outfitted in an unflattering dress, apron,
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welfare system becomes a misnomer. It focuses on punishing what white America has deemed
“disgraceful parenting” instead of deciding what is actually best for the child. The attempt to
penalize “bad mothers” and bad parenting ultimately hurts the child. 110 Separating a child from
its familial bond is extremely destructive.
The University of Florida conducted a study of infants born addicted to crack
cocaine. 111 Researchers followed one group of babies that were placed in foster
care and another group that remained with their birth mothers. 112 Although the
birth mothers were struggling with addiction, they were still able to care for the
infants. 113 After six months, the babies were measured with regard to infant
development. 114 The children placed with their birth mothers consistently
developed better than those placed in foster care. 115 Researchers concluded the
separation from their mothers was more toxic than the cocaine to the foster care
children. 116

The goal of the child welfare system should be to reunify families so that children will
not suffer the toxic loss of their familial bonds. Instead, the ASFA provides incentives to states
for placing black children in adoptive homes. Joyce Pavao, a family therapist who specializes in
adoption issues tells the story of a foster child whose parents had their rights terminated. 117 The
boy was subsequently adopted by a new family; however, he would go to a telephone booth and
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call his biological grandmother after the adoption was finalized. 118 He had communicated with
this grandmother for all of his life including while he was in foster care.119 Social workers told
the adoptive parents that these lingering connections were illegal and would distract from the
bonding process with the new family. 120 Pavao disagrees with the validity of this assumption
stating, “[T]here is no true understanding of the need that these children had for the people who
had been positive and present in their very complicated, and often traumatic, lives.” 121 The
ASFA and its push for adoption does not value the child’s bonds before foster care. Although
there are problematic issues in the home, these issues do not negate the child’s emotional
attachment to his or her parents and family members.
When describing the ASFA, one Senator commented, “The law is going to be about the
joy of adoption and the bonding of a ‘real family’ to so many kids.” 122 It is this notion that black
families are not “real families” that allows our government to rip black children away from their
parents. It is beyond their imagination that “black children in foster care have a strong, loving,
healthy and emotional attachment to their parents.” 123 By promoting adoption of black children,
the ASFA permanently severs this emotional attachment.
After the ASFA took effect, adoptions of foster children increased from 28,000 per year
in 1996 to 50,000 per year in 2000. 124 Although this may seem like a lot, in reality, this amounts
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to less than one percent of the children in the foster care system being adopted. 125 Meanwhile,
because the ASFA makes it easier to needlessly take children from their homes, the foster care
population is increasing by an average of four percent a year. 126 Children are entering the
system at a higher rate than they are being adopted, therefore the ultimate goal of the ASFA will
never be realized. “America is not going to adopt its way out of the foster care crisis.” 127
Furthermore, black children are considerably less likely to be adopted than white
children. 128 A California study of 3873 children who were younger than six years old when they
entered foster care found that race had a substantial effect on their experience. 129 Even when all
other things are equal, white children were five times more likely to be adopted than black
children. 130 A black infant had the same likelihood of being adopted as a three to five-year-old
white child. 131 Therefore, even after parental rights have been terminated, black children will
continue to drift between foster care placements. Now, however, any hope of reunification with
their biological parents is lost. Most will never experience “the real family” policymakers
imagined, and instead will become permanent wards of the state.
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VI. THE ASFA PERPETUATES RACISM AGAINST THE BLACK COMMUNITY
The destruction mandated by the ASFA not only affects individual black families, it
perpetuates racism and disrupts the entire black community. Family integrity has always been
critical to the welfare of the black community. 132 After emancipation, many blacks made efforts
to find family members and reunify where slavery had disconnected them. 133 They understood
the necessity of familial connections. 134 The family served as the means of transferring “survival
skills, values and self-esteem” to future generations. 135 State interference in the black home
interferes with the black community’s ability to transmit personal and community identity to its
children. 136
In addition, by devaluing the autonomy and relationships of the black family, the ASFA
sends a clear message about the inferiority of the black race. The message that black people do
not have the capacity to govern themselves and need state intervention in their families devalues
black people and perpetuates the racial hierarchy that continues to oppress the black community.
Growing up under this shield of inferiority is especially harmful to black children.
As renowned historian Dr. John Henrik Clarke noted, “[T]he family is the soul, the spirit
and the cornerstone of the nation. If the family dies, so does the nation.” 137 With this
understanding that families are the essential network that builds a nation, strong black families
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are imperative to the liberation and economic advancement of the black community. 138 Family
associations serve an important political function. 139 They both facilitate and constrain the
power of the government by nurturing support and resistance of particular governmental
views. 140 Disrupting black families harms the political power of the black community and
usurps its ability to effectuate social change. 141 It weakens the collective ability for black people
to overcome “institutionalized discrimination and work toward greater political and economic
strength” and ultimately, “reinforces the continued political subordination of blacks as a
group.” 142

VII. THE ASFA DOES NOT ADDRESS THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT THAT
RESULTS IN THE PLACEMENT OF BLACK CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
The ASFA represented the first piece of legislation in which “states have a federal
mandate to protect children from abuse and neglect but no corresponding mandate to provide
basic economic support to poor families.” 143 It has already been demonstrated that the ASFA’s
goal of adoption will do little to cure the overpopulation of children in the foster care system.
Instead, policymakers should focus on the underlying social ills of poverty, incarceration and
substance abuse that plague the communities of this nation’s poor. Dorothy Roberts, an expert
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on child welfare policy, 144 noted, “[I]n the past several decades, the number of children receiving
welfare services has declined dramatically, while the foster care population has skyrocketed. As
the child welfare system began to serve fewer white children and more children of color, state
and federal governments spent more money on out-of-home care and less on in-homeservices.” 145
Foster care has become the main resource that the child welfare system provides to black
families in need. 146 The ideology of “rescuing the child” by removing it from the home has
caused caseworkers to separate children from their parents even when it may not be in the best
interest of the child. 147 Parents may often still be able to care for their children while they face
substance abuse issues. 148 In most cases “keeping children with their parents while offering
intensive family preservation services and drug treatment is safer, more stable, and less traumatic
for children than placing them in the care of strangers in the foster care system.” 149 Child
welfare policy needs to place a greater emphasis on family preservation programs for the sake of
the children.
Although family preservation programs are essential to combat the increase in foster care
placements, local governments oftentimes do not have the financial resources to fund such
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programs. 150 A 2005 nationwide survey of city officials released by the National League of
Cities and the Institute for Youth, Education and Families, determined that affordable housing,
high-quality child care, before and after-school programs and substance abuse programs were
significantly lacking in many communities. 151 The survey also identified a need for more
employment opportunities for adults, parenting education, youth employment and youth crime
prevention programs, child abuse prevention efforts and early childhood education programs. 152
All of these programs require a financial commitment from the state. Without such a
commitment, more children are likely to be removed from their homes as a consequence of
extreme poverty, and black children will continue to be ripped away from their families.
VIII. THE ASFA INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FAMILY
INTEGRITY
The ASFA can also be analyzed through the framework of constitutionality. The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized family integrity as a fundamental right. 153 If a right is
“fundamental,” it is entitled to heightened protection from state inference. 154 Therefore, any
state action that infringes on a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny. 155 Strict scrutiny
requires courts to perform a two part analysis. First, the state action must be justified by a
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compelling governmental interest, and the means chosen must be essential to furthering that
interest. 156 Second, the state action must be the least intrusive way of furthering the
governmental interest. 157
Child protection is a compelling interest and clearly justifies state intervention into the
family sphere. 158 The question then becomes: “Is removal of the child from the parent’s custody
the essential, least restrictive means of protecting the child?”159 Since states have continuously
reduced social service programs, foster care is often the only service available to protect the
child. Courts should use their authority to require policymakers to develop less “restrictive
means” than the removal of children from their homes to further the interest of child protection.
Without this check from the bench, legislation like the ASFA will continue to make it easier to
remove black children from their homes.
Even if foster care is found to be the “least restrictive means” of achieving child
protection, serious constitutional problems arise when the state attempts to terminate parental
rights. The fundamental right the parent and child have in staying together remains intact, even
after temporary removal through foster care. The state must have a new interest, aside from
child protection, to justify terminating the parental rights of a parent. While a state may argue
that permanency or providing a safe and stable home for the child is its compelling interest,
terminating parental rights is oftentimes not essential to furthering this interest.
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Under the strict scrutiny standard, the state must demonstrate that terminating parental
rights is essential to achieving permanency in the life of a child. Terminating parental rights
without more is not an essential means of achieving permanency. Permanency can better be
achieved either through reunification or adoption. Although terminating parental rights makes
the adoption process easier, as discussed previously, termination alone does not ensure the child
is adopted. Termination is therefore not an appropriate “means” to achieve permanency. The
strict scrutiny standard requires more. An adoptive home must be in place before parental rights
are terminated. This will ensure rights are only terminated where a means of achieving
permanency exists. Without such an adoptive home, the fundamental right to the parent-child
relationship should not be severed.
Even if a court determines that terminating parental rights is a means to achieve
permanency, the termination still does not withstand strict scrutiny. The second part of the strict
scrutiny analysis is that the state must demonstrate that termination is the least restrictive means
of achieving a safe and stable home for the child. This requirement was put in place to ensure
there are no less restrictive alternatives available that would achieve the same interest without
violating a fundamental right. 160 There are situations where it is necessary to terminate parental
rights because children are being seriously abused and are at serious risk of harm from their
parents. The ASFA, however, does not distinguish these serious cases, which are relatively rare,
from the majority of cases where children enter foster care because of neglect. These children
have not suffered, nor are they at serious risk of suffering, child abuse; therefore the state should
not be able to terminate parental rights because less restrictive alternatives are available.

160

See id. at 272.

329

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

VOL. 1, NO. 1

For example, the state may seek to terminate the rights of a parent whose child was
placed in foster care because she was living in unsanitary conditions and was often forced to go
hungry. Without government assistance, the parent has been deemed unfit. She is unable to
meet the specifics of the case plan to secure adequate housing and a steady income. Instead of
severing the fundamental right to a family, a less restrictive means would be for the state to
provide adequate funds for the families’ basic necessities of food and shelter. 161 Terminating
parental rights is over-inclusive. 162 Spending money to provide families with meaningful aid is a
clear alternative to termination. Furthermore, termination does not get at the heart of the
problem that created the neglectful environment. It focuses on punishing the parent for making
bad choices or sometimes for simply being poor.
Additionally, in 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court held the fifteen month provision of the
state’s Adoption Act unconstitutional. 163 The law, based on the mandate of the ASFA, presumed
a parent unfit after a child had been in foster care for fifteen months and moved to terminate
parental rights. 164 In re H.G. involved a parent whose substance abuse problem prevented her
from meeting the requirements stipulated by caseworkers, and therefore from achieving
reunification within the fifteen month specification. 165 The Illinois Supreme Court recognized
the fundamental right to family integrity and invoked strict scrutiny to analyze the state’s
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action. 166 The court held the provision was unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due
process under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution. 167 The presumption
of unfitness was not narrowly tailored to the compelling goal of identifying unfit parents,
because in many cases the length of a child's stay in foster care had nothing to do with the
parent's ability or inability to safely care for the child, but instead was due to circumstances
beyond the parent's control. 168 This step by the Illinois Supreme Court is indeed a victory for
black families.

IX. EQUAL PROTECTION AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS OF
THE ASFA
There are additional procedural challenges to the constitutionality of terminating parental
rights. Since poor, black families are disproportionately affected by the ASFA’s fifteen month
parental rights termination provision, a discrimination claim may be viable because of the
legislation’s disparate impact on blacks. 169 Washington v. Davis, however, deflates the hopes of
substantiating the claim. 170 Although the disparity along racial lines is clear in the foster care
system, it can easily be attributed to economics instead of racial discrimination. In Davis, the
Supreme Court held that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, if
disparate impact on racial grounds is explainable on non-racial grounds, then the law is not
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unconstitutional. 171 A recent Tennessee District Court decision in Brian A. v. Sundquist,
however, acknowledged that race impacted foster care services in Tennessee. 172 Although the
suit was filed on behalf of all foster children in state custody, it contained a putative subclass of
black children alleging that not specifically the ASFA, but the Tennessee adoption and
permanency services, generally, had a discriminatory effect on black foster children. 173 The case
was settled on July 30, 2001. 174 The settlement included general provisions to reform the foster
care system as well as specific provisions to evaluate if black children “receive disparate
treatment or suffer disparate impact, to assess the causes for such disparities, and recommend
solutions.” 175 Although this settlement holds the state accountable for its actions on behalf of
black children, a more plausible attack on the constitutionality of the ASFA’s termination
provision would be a disparate impact claim based not on race, but on poverty. 176
The unconstitutionality of the ASFA’s fifteen month termination provision because of its
disparate impact on the poor is supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 177
In M.L.B., the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow a state to condition
appeal from a termination proceeding on an indigent parent’s ability to pay for transcript fees,
where the transcript is necessary for the proceedings. 178 The Court stated, “[c]hoices about
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marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associated rights this Court has
ranked as ‘of basic importance in our society’…rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment
against the State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard or disrespect.” 179 The Court concluded
that termination of parental rights was comparable to a criminal punishment. 180 Unlike loss of
custody, the termination of parental rights is irrevocable and results in the loss of one of the most
fundamental relationships. 181 This decision introduces the precedent that termination
proceedings cannot disparately impact the poor. 182 Indigent parents cannot be forced to endure
the severity of a termination of their parental rights because of their poverty.
Under the M.L.B. precedent, it could be argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should
protect not only the ability to a pay transcript fee, but also other limitations imposed by poverty
such as the ability to secure housing or obtain adequate heating or utilities. An indigent parent
who is unable to retain custody of their children within the ASFA’s fifteen month provision
because of challenges created by extreme poverty should be able to argue a viable disparate
impact challenge to termination. 183
Another way to challenge the constitutionality of terminating the parental rights of black
parents is through the Due Process Clause. 184 In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires at least clear and convincing
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evidence in a proceeding to terminate parents’ rights to their children. 185 The Court noted the
evidence presented at termination hearings is very subjective.186 Value judgments are often
included in appraisals of the nature and quality of the parent-child relationship. 187 Additionally,
the agency’s power in the vast majority of cases is far greater than parents’ best efforts at
defending themselves. 188 The Supreme Court held that because the process is highly susceptible
to error, it is entitled to heightened procedural protection. 189 The Court therefore concluded that
proof by preponderance of the evidence is inappropriate and a termination requires at least the
intermediate standard of proof, clear and convincing evidence. 190
Instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard the Court dictated in Santosky, a
more appropriate standard of proof would be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 191 The
reasonable doubt standard is used in criminal matters and stems from societal concern regarding
the risk of error. 192 Criminal conviction results in incarceration and a deprivation of physical
liberty. In order to subject an individual to such severe punishment, our society demands this
heightened, reasonable doubt standard of proof. The Supreme Court has stated, “the risk of error
to the individual must be minimized even at the risk that some who are guilty might go free.” 193
185
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Termination of parental rights is comparable to a criminal conviction and should require
the reasonable doubt standard of proof. In Santosky, the Court admits a termination proceeding
“bears many of the indicia of a criminal trial.” 194 Comparing incarceration to a termination of
parental rights, Justice Stevens commented that “often the deprivation of parental rights will be
the more grievous of the two.” 195 Incarceration is usually only for a specific period of time,
while termination is irreversible and severs the familial bond forever. Therefore, society should
demand the strictest standard of proof before severing familial bonds.
Congress did apply the reasonable doubt standard of proof to the termination of parental
rights in the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). 196 The ICWA was enacted because
Congress recognized the problems associated with excessive state intrusion into Native
American families. 197 They wanted to combat the disproportionately high percentage of Native
American children removed from their homes. 198 The ICWA takes the viewpoint that the best
interest of the child is to remain with his or her family. 199 The legislation assures parents the
procedural protection of assistance of counsel and removes a child from the home only upon the
ultimate finding, established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that continued parental custody
would probably result in serious damage to the child. 200
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Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982).
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Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

196

25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1988).
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See Bohl, supra note 191, at 358.
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Id. at 359.
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25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
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Congress understood that removing Native American children from their families
resulted in the general destruction of Indian culture, but demonstrates no such understanding
when it comes to black families and culture. The ICWA adopts the position that it is in the best
interests of a Native American child to remain with his or her family and implements this
presumption through jurisdictional provisions. 201 In contrast, the ASFA takes the position that
adoption, often to white homes, is in the best interest of black children.

X. CONCLUSION
The ASFA devalues black families by severing the bond between black children and their
parents. Under the guise of achieving permanency in the lives of children, the legislation
terminates parental rights and makes adoption, instead of reunification, its priority. The ASFA
provides financial incentives to terminate the rights of black parents and place their children up
for adoption, but no financial support for programs to reunify their families.
Family is the foundation of a community. Preservation of black families is essential to
the advancement of the black community. By destroying black families, the ASFA disrupts the
political power of the black community and prohibits the community from transferring culture
and a sense of identity to future generations. Furthermore, the ASFA’s termination of parental
rights raises issues of constitutionality on substantive and procedural due process and equal
protection grounds.
The child welfare system must take into account the disproportionate effect and
destruction the ASFA has on the black community. A shift in the focus of the system, with
legislation directed at addressing the underlying social ills that are at the root of foster care

201

Bohl, supra note 191, at 359.
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dependence is essential. Respect for the familial bonds between black children and their parents
must be supreme. Our child welfare system must focus its efforts on family preservation and
reunification instead of permanently severing the relationship between black children and their
parents.
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